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TAXATION OF MISAPPROPRIATED PROPERTY: THE DECLINE
AND INCOMPLETE FALL OF WILCOX*
THE definition of taxable income in Section 22(a) of the Internal Revenue
Code draws no distinction between lawful and unlawful gains.1 Profits of
illegal businesses, such as bootlegging and bookmaking, and proceeds of u.n-
lawful transactions, such as bribes, have always been taxed.2 However, the
*Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
1. The Income Tax Act of 1913, §IIB, 38 STAT. 167 (1913), taxed, among other
things, "gains, profits, and income derived from . . . the transaction of any lawfi busi-
ness" (emphasis added). The word "lawful" has been absent since the Income Tax Act
of 1916, § 2(a), 39 STAT. 757 (1916). On the basis of this omission, courts have inferred
that Congress intended to tax illegal, as well as legal, gains. E.g., Rutkin v. United States,
343 U.S. 130, 138 (1952) ; United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263 (1927). See Com-
missioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 411 (1946) (dissenting opinion). On the taxability of
illegal income generally, see 1 IERTENs, THE LAw OF FEIDERAL INcom0 TAXATION § 4.11
(1942, Supp. 1952) ; Geller & Rogers, How the Federal Incone Tax Applies to Illegal
and Unlawful Gains, 27 TAxES 214 (1949).
The privilege against self-incrimination does not excuse the failure to report illegal
income. United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 264 (1927). But the Bureau of Internal
Revenue has permitted criminals to report income in round numbers with non-incrimi.
nating designations as to source, such as "gambling gains" or "other income." SEN. Rr',.
No. 141, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 31-2 (1951). This policy has been severely criticlcd as
conducive to tax evasion and thus unfair to honest taxpayers, particularly to corporations
(which are required to keep detailed records). See, e.g., 98 Cong. Rec. 6128-30 (May 27,
1952) ; Baker, Taxation: Potential Destroyer of Crimze, 29 Ciix-KnixT REv. 197, 217
(1951). Recently, legislation was proposed which would require more specific disclosure
of income sources, but the bill died in committee. H.R. 7893, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
See generally Meltzer, Required Records, The McCarraip Act, and the Privilege Againsl
Self-Incrimination, 18 U. OF Cur. L. Rxv. 687, 708-19 (1951).
2. Illegal businesses: United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259 (1927) (bootlegging);
United States v. Chapman, 168 F.2d 997 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 853 (1948)
(black market in meat packing) ; Barker v. Magruder, 95 F.2d 122 (D.C. Cir. 1938)
(usurious loans) ; Steinberg v. United States, 14 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1926) (bootlegging) ;
James P. McKenna, 1 B.T.A. 326 (1925) (bookmaking); Wallace H. Petit, 10 T.C. 1253
(1948) (black market profits of wholesale grocery); George L. Rickard, 15 B.T.A. 316
(1929) (prize-fight movies illegally transported in interstate commerce). See also Mary
Luginbuhl, 8 T.C.M. 968 (1949) (taxability of abortionist's income not challenged).
Unlawful transactions: Caldwell v. Commissioner, 135 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1943)
("kickbacks" from contractors) ; Chadick v. United States, 77 F.2d 961 (5th Cir. 1935)
(graft) ; Patterson v. Anderson, 20 F. Supp. 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (illegal insurance con-
tract); L. Weiner, 10 B.T.A. 905 (1928) (poker winnings); A. L. Voyer, 4 B.T.A. 1192
(1926) (lottery winnings). See also Johnson v. United States, 318 U.S. 189 (1943) ("pro-
tection" payments).
Income unlawfully received from a corporation, such as dividends, bonuses, and sala-
ries, paid in violation of the rights of stockholders or creditors, is taxable. See Comment,
58 YALE L.J. 955, 960 n.26 (1949).
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tax status of wrongful appropriations has been less certain. 3 Early dicta in
the Second Circuit indicated that proceeds of embezzlement, robbery, and
burglary were not taxable.4 But subsequent development of the "claim of
right" doctrine, indicating that funds were taxable to the recipient when he
treated them as his own, even if he lacked a legal right to them,5 caused the
Second Circuit to repudiate its dicta.0 Ransom money was later taxed in the
year of receipt by the Seventh Circuit; 7 embezzled funds, by the Eighth Cir-
cuit.8 The Fifth Circuit disagreed with the Eighth on the theory that an em-
bezzler lacks any "color of right" to his loot and is under an immediate legal
duty to repay it.9
The Supreme Court later followed the view of the Fifth Circuit. In the now
famous Wilcox case, 10 the Court held an embezzler immune from taxation
in the year of embezzlement on the ground that he then lacks a "claim of
right" to, and is under a "definite, unconditional obligation to repay," the
misappropriated funds "-although the Court indicated, in dicta, that the
"cancellation or retirement" of the "unconditional" indebtedness might pro-
duce taxable income."- Clearly, the Court departed from the previous inter-
3. See Geller & Rogers, Embezzlement Has Its Tax Problkm, Too, 26 TAXES 1097
(1948).
4. See Rau v. United States, 260 Fed. 131, 136 (2d Cir. 1919) ; Steinberg v. United
States, 14 F.2d 564, 566 (2d Cir. 1926).
5. The "claim of right" doctrine was adopted by the Supreme Court in North Ameri-
can Oil Consolidated v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417 (1932). But this decision did not make
clear whether "claim of right" referred to the taxpayer's legal right to receipts or merely
to his treatment of the receipts as his own. Subsequent cases generally used "claim of
right" in the latter sense. See note 13 in;fra.
6. National City Bank v. Helvering, 9S F.2d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 1933).
7. Humphreys v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1942).
8. Kurrle v. Helvering, 126 F.2d 723 (Sth Cir. 1942). The Treasury Department had
previously taken this stand. G.C.M. 16572, XV-1 Cum. BunL 82 (1936).
9. McKnight v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1942). The duty to repay
is normally not imposed on the taxpayers in the cases cited in note 2 supr7a, since they
generally acquired money, not from innocent victims, but from willing participants in
illegal activity. Since these participants stand in pari delicto with the recipients, they
cannot seek recovery. However, several state statutes allow recovery of gambling losses.
E.g., 3 CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 6786 (1949) ; N.Y. PN.'%, Ltw § 995. Some have speculated
that such statutes might preclude the taxability of gambling gains. Baker, Taxaisz:
Potential Destroyer of Crime, 29 CHI-KENT Rnv. 197, 207-09 (1951); Note, 34 CAur.
L. REv. 449, 450 (1946). But this possibility has been definitely removed. Rutkin v.
United States, 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
10. Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404 (1946); noted, inter alia, 34 CA~r-. L
REv. 449 (1946); 22 IND. L.J. 99 (1946); 25 TEx. L. REv. 693 (1947). The case is also
discussed in Geller & Rogers, Embezzlement Has Its Tax Problems, Too, 26 TAxs 1097,
1100 (1948) ; Comment, 53 YAi.E .J. 955, 962-3 (1949).
11. 327 U.S. at 408.
12. Ibid. See note 37 infra. The Court also declared that taxable income might
arise if the wrongdoer earned profits on the embezzled funds. Cf. United States v. Iozia,
104 F. Supp. 846 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (receipts from sale of converted goads taxed).
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pretation of "claim of right." A taxpayer who treated funds as his own had
been regarded as having a "claim of right" and thus was the recipient of tax-
able income, even though he might later be forced to repay.18 Wilcox ignored
the taxpayer's treatment of the funds and equated "claim of right" with a
"bona fide legal or equitable claim.' 4 The Court did not define the latter
phrase, but it seems reasonable to assume-if good faith means anything-
that all wrongdoers who take from innocent parties would lack a "claim of
right."' 5 However, by also failing to define "unconditional obligation," the
Court left its criteria of taxability in doubt. Misappropriators who acquire
title to property might be taxed, since the obligation to repay is theoretically
contingent on the rightful owner's first voiding the title.', But a broader
interpretation of "unconditional" would exempt all misappropriators from
taxation in the year of receipt, whether or not they acquired title.17
13. National City Bank v. Helvering, 98 F.2d 93, 96 (2d Cir. 1938) (executive taxed
on misappropriated corporate income) ; Penn v. Robertson, 115 F.2d 167 (4th Cir. 1940)
(dividends taxable to recipient, although paid under stock allotment plan declared to be
void ab initio) ; United States v. Wampler, 5 F. Supp. 796 (D. Md. 1934) (attorney
taxed on funds misappropriated from client). See Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404,
410 (1946) (dissenting opinion). But cf. Commissioner v. Turney, 82 F.2d 661 (5th Cir.
1936) (part of oil royalties owed to Texas under state statute held not taxable even though
taxpayer apparently had no intention of paying the state), criticized in National City
Bank v. Helvering, supra. See, generally, Comment, 58 YA. L.J. 955 (1949).
An agent is obligated to turn over to his principal any gains, however illicit, such as
bribes, that he receives by virtue of his employment. 2 RESTATEMENT, AGENCY §§ 388,
403 (1933) ; RESTATIENT, RESTITUTION § 197 (1937). This rule, however, has not de-
terred courts from levying a tax on agents for such income. Caldwell v. Commissioner,
135 F.2d 488 (5th Cir. 1943) ("kickbacks"). See also post-Wilcox cases: United States
v. Chapman, 168 F.2d 997 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 853 (1948) (black market
premiums); Wallace H. Petit, 10 T.C. 1253 (1948) (same).
14. "Without some bona fide legal or equitable claim, even though it be contingent or
contested in nature, the taxpayer cannot be said to have received any gain or profit within
the reach of § 22(a)." Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 408 (1946).
15. See United States v. Rutkin, 189 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1951), aff'd (using different
rationale), 343 U.S. 130 (1952) (extorted funds held taxable). Two judges in the Court
of Appeals found that by virtue of past business dealings with his victim, the extortioner
had a "semblance of a bona fide claim of right." 189 F.2d at 435. One judge dissented,
inter alia, on the basis of the extortioner's obvious "bad faith." Id. at 442. Four justices
of the Supreme Court agreed. 343 U.S. at 139. By contrast, courts have applied the Wil-
cox "good faith" standard to tax those who receive income as the result of an innocent
mistake of fact, believing it to be rightfully theirs, and repay it promptly upon discovery
of the error. United States v. Lewis, 340 U.S. 590 (1951) (improperly computed bonus) ;
Haberkorn v. United States, 173 F.2d 587 (6th Cir. 1949) (same). Thus, paradoxically,
"good faith" incurs tax liability while "bad faith" may avoid it.
16. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION §§64, 144 (1937). At one point, Wilcox calls at-
tention to the fact that "All right, title and interest in the (embezzled] money rested with
the employer." Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 409 (1946) (emphasis added), See
also Akers v. Scofield, 167 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 823 (1948). And
see 44 Micii. L. REv. 885 (1946).
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The ambiguity implicit in "unconditional obligation to repay" thus left un-
clear what wrongful appropriations would escape taxation upon receipt. If
the absence of title fulfills this requirement, only the loot of embezzlers and
thieves would be tax exempt. Such wrongdoers are held to lack title because
they take the property without the rightful owner's consent.1 , Swindlers and
extortioners, however, would be taxed. Under prevailing doctrine, they ac-
quire title because their victims, although deceived or coerced, deliver property
to them with the present intention that they keep it.10 On the other hand,
if wrongdoers who acquire voidable title are also under an "unconditional"
obligation to repay, swindlers and extortioners as well as thieves and em-
bezzlers would escape taxation at the time of misappropriation. The lower
courts, in effect, made voidable title the dividing line. Two Tax Court cases,
relying on TWilcox without discussion, held embezzled funds non-taxable in
the year of receipt ;20 a district court, in dicta, indicated that stolen goods
were not taxable when taken.2 1 But the Tax Court, finding that the payers
consented to the transfer, held extorted funds taxable in the year of extor-
tion.22 And the Fifth Circuit in the Akers case taxed swindled money upon
receipt because the court thought that a swindler should be estopped from
denying his title in order to avoid taation.3
In Rutkin v. United StateS,24 the Supreme Court held extorted funds tax-
able, but on a rationale that embraced two conflicting criteria for taxing other
unlawful gains. The Court, five to four, affirmed a conviction for tax exasion
based on the defendant's failure to report extorted funds as income. 5 Ignor-
17. See Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 139-40 (1952) (dissenting opinion);
United States v. Rutkin, 189 F.2d 431, 441-2 (3d Cir. 1951) (dissenting opinion).
18. BnowN, LAw OF PRsom.u. PRoPERY 19-21, § 15 (1936); Cor ya, LAw op Rr-
PLmVL §410 (2d ed. 1900).
19. BRowx, op. cit. svpra note 18, §70; 2 ButRDIcK, Tan L.w op Cu-._ §§535, 635
(1946) ; 3 WVu.sToNz, SALES oF GooDs §§ 625a, 635 (194S).
20. George H. Conradson, 5 T.C.M. 112 (1946); Agnes McCue, S T.C.M. 141
(1946).
21. See United States v. Iozia, 104 F. Supp. 846, 84S (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (proceeds from
sale of converted goods taxable).
22. Estate of Joseph Nitto, 13 T.C. 853 (1949).
23. Akers v. Scofield, 167 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. M3 (1948);
37 IL. B.J. 92 (1948); 18 Om.A. ST. B.J. 1752 (1947); 1 VAiD. L R.v. 299 (1943).
Prior to Wilcox, courts generally refused to allow taxpayers to raise their wrongful con-
duct as a bar to taxation. E.g., Johnston v. McLaughlin, 55 F2d 10GS, IC69 (9th Cir.
1932) ; Commonwealth Investment Co., 44 B.T.A. 445, 451 (1941) ; James P. MeKenna,
1 B.T.A. 326, 328 (1925). Contra: McKnight v. Commissioner, 127 F.2d 572 (5th Cir.
1942).
24. 343 U.S. 130 (1952).
25. Justice Burton, lone dissenter in lVilcox. wrote the majority opinion. The four
dissenters charged that "the Court today adopts the reasoning of his prior dissent, there-
by rejecting the Vilcox interpretation of §22(a)." Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S.
130, 140. See note 26 infra.
Neither the majority nor the minority discussed the legal possibility (or impossibility)
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ing the Wilcox rationale, the majority seemed to erect a new test of tax-
ability: "An unlawful gain, as well as a lawful one, constitutes taxable in-
come when its recipient has such control over it that, as a practical matter,
he derives readily realizable economic value from it."'20 This standard would
presumably tax all wrongful appropriations, including embezzlements and
thefts, since a wrongdoer obtains at least temporary "control" over his loot.
But the majority refused to overrule Wilcox; they confined the earlier decision
to its facts and then distinguished it by noting that an extortioner, unlike an
embezzler, obtains funds "from a victim with his consent."2 7 The Court did
not explain the significance of such consent. Yet its only legal consequence
is to pass voidable title to the wrongdoer.28 In effect, Rittkin did not decide
whether control or voidable title will be the measure of taxability, thus leaving
uncertain the future tax status of theft and embezzlement.
Application of the "control" criterion to all illegal income would eliminate
the unrealistic distinction voidable title makes between different classes of
wrongdoers. Embezzlers and thieves enjoy the same economic advantages
from their loot as do swindlers and extortioners. True, embezzlers and thieves
are theoretically under an immediate duty to repay because they lack title to
their ill-gotten gains, 29 while swindlers and extortioners are not obliged to
repay until the rightful owner voids their title.8 0 But in either case the vic-
tim may be forced to use the courts to enforce his rights. The only other
doctrinal difference between the two classes of wrongdoers lies in their ability
to pass good title to third parties. Swindlers and extortioners can pass title
to good faith purchasers whose rights to the property will be superior to those
of the rightful owner.31 On the other hand, embezzlers and thieves can pass
good title to third parties only when transferring money and negotiable in-
of proving "wilfulness" in a tax evasion prosecution in which the question of taxability
is decided, five to four, by the Supreme Court. See United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S.
389, 396 (1933).
26. Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 137 (1952). This formulation seems little
different from the pre-Wilcox "claim of right" test. See note 13 supra and accompanying
text. In fact, to buttress its criterion, the Court quoted from National City Bank v. Hel-
vering, 98 F.2d 93 (2d Cir. 1938), where the Second Circuit advanced perhaps the broad-
est interpretation of the pre-Wilcox doctrine.
27. Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 138 (1952). See also Estate of Joseph
Nitto, 13 T.C. 858, 866-7 (1949).
28. See note 19 sutpra.
29. See Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 408 (1946).
30. RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcTs §§ 476, 495 (1932) ; RESTATEMENT, REsTrrOTIO N §§ 64,
144 (1937). But unreasonable delay by the victim may defeat his right to avoid title if
injury to third parties who relied on the wrongdoer's possession, or inordinate injury to
the wrongdoer, would result. RESTATEMENT, CoNTRACTS § 483 (1932); RESTATMENr,
RESTITUTION § 64 (1937). In such a case the victim must seek a money recovery. Id,
§ 144, comment b.
31. RESTATEMENT, REsTiTuTioN §§ 172, 173 (1937); UNIFORM SAILs AcT § 24; 3
WILLISTON, SALES OF GOODS § 650 (1948).
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struments.3 2 The effect of this inability to pass title to chattels is to permit
the rightful owner to recover also from an innocent transfereeP who may
then sue the wrongdoer.34 To exempt thieves and embezzlers from taxation
because they lack this incident of ownership 35 is to ignore the fact that its
absence does not affect their liability to the original owner and only occasion-
ally hinders them in disposing of their loot to unknowing third parties.!
The "control" test also avoids the inequities and drawbacks of the delay
in the imposition of taxes necessitated by the title standards. Under the Vilcox
rationale, voidable title or the absence of title does not exempt misappro-
priated property from taxation permanently but merely postpones liability until
the victim's forgiveness or the running of the statute of limitations bestows
good title upon the wrongdoer.3 7  Such a delay accords wrongdoers more
favorable tax treatment than honest taxpayers. A law-abiding citizen must
32. BROWN, LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY §§67, 69 (1936); UNrzonm NcOrEoA.
INsTRuMENTs LAW § 57.
33. 1 RESTATEmNT, Toars § 229 (1934) ; BRow., I.,w oF PutsorzA. PnoRTrT § 67
(1936) ; CoBBEY, LAW oF REPLmN § 410 (2d ed. 1900).
34. REsTATEM-T, RESTITUTION §§ 89, 91 (1937).
35. Individuals, after disposing of most of the incidents of ownership, have been
taxed for retaining far less control over income than the wrongdoers possess. E.g., Burnet
v. Wells, 289 U.S. 670 (1933) (trust income applied to pa muent of insurance premiums
on settlor's life taxable to settlor) ; Corliss v. Bowers, 281 U.S. 376 (1930) (income to
settlor's wife from revocable trust taxable to settor). Cf. Helvering v. Horst, 311 U.S.
112 (1940) (interest accrued on bond coupons, given to son, taxed to father whri retained
bonds).
36. Under some circumstances, such as the sale of automobiles, a document of title
is necessary to transfer title. See 2 WiLLISTON, SA.L.s OF GooDs § 316 (1948). Inability
to provide the document of title may therefore inhibit sales to those who know such papers
are required.
37. See text at note 12 supra. Wilcox spoke of "forgiveness or condonation" by the
rightful owner, Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 409-10 (1946), and of "cancel-
lation or retirement" of the indebtedness, id. at 408. The Court of Apl:als in Ruttlin
apparently interpreted "condonation" to include inaction by the rightful owner which
allowed the statute of limitations to run. United States v. Rutkin, 189 F2d 431, 435 (3d
Cir. 1951). However, the court held the funds taxable in the year of receipt rather than
in the year the statute ran.
For a general discussion of statutes of limitations on the right to recover property,
see BRowN, LAW OF PmsoxAL PRoPEmnr § 16 (1936). When a statute runs, the wrong-
doer obtains title which is good against all parties. Ibid.
Extinguishment of an obligation to repay by an act of the creditor may result in the
debtor receiving either income or a gift. Conipare Commissioner v. Jacobson, 336 U.S.
28 (1949) (forgiveness of debt led to income), uith Helvering ,. American Dental Co.,
318 U.S. 322 (1943) (forgiveness of debt led to gift). But when the statute of limitations
extinguishes the duty to repay, the debtor will probably be held to have received income.
Securities Co. v. United States, 85 F. Supp. 532 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (A-cricain Dental dis-
tinguished). Cf. Boston Consol. Gas Co. v. Commissioner, 123 F.2d 473, 475 (1st Cir.
1942) (unclaimed deposits and refunds); Charleston & W.C. Ry. v. Burnet, 50 F2d 342
(D.C. Cir. 1931) (unclaimed wages); Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Commissioner, 47 F2d
990 (7th Cir. 1931) (unclaimed fare overcharges).
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pay a tax on funds which he receives and treats as his own, even though he
later discovers the funds must be repaid.38 Such taxpayers forego the oppor-
tunity to earn interest on the amount paid in taxes and run the risk that the
deduction allowed in the year of repayment may not offset the tax paid in the
year of receipt.3 9 The wrongdoer, however, benefits from the use of the
money that he would otherwise have paid earlier in taxes and avoids the risk of
a possibly useless deduction in the year of repayment. Furthermore, post-
poned taxation reduces the Government's chances of ever collecting any revenue
on illegal income. During the delay the wrongdoer might spend his ill-gotten
gains and frustrate taxation by insolvency.4 0 And the difficulty of discovering
the extinguishment of his duty to repay would compound the problems of
enforcement officers, already burdened with the task of discovering the wrong-
doer's acquisition of the funds.41 In addition, the exemption of embezzled
funds from taxation in the year of receipt might prove helpful to unscrupulous
businessmen. Members of partnerships and owners of closely-held corpora-
tions might omit from their returns company receipts pocketed with the tacit
approval of their associates. When faced with a tax evasion prosecution or a
claim for unpaid taxes for the year of receipt, they might choose to resist
prosecution or payment with the argument that the money was "embezzled"
and thus not taxable in that year.42 And, by giving a note to the company for
the unreported sum, they could seek to keep alive their "obligation to repay"
beyond the statute of limitations on the company's action to recover the
38. See notes 5 and 13 supra.
39. This result has been severely criticized. E.g., Comment, 58 YALE L.J, 955, 955-8
(1949); 35 IOwA L. Rsv. 118, 121-2 (1949); MAGILL, TAXAL INcomE 209-10 (1945).
Under the "control" test all illegal gains would presumably be taxed upon receipt.
If the wrongdoer later repays the rightful owner, he probably will be entitled to a de-
duction. Payments to private parties for violations of statutes and common law, unlike
penalties paid to the government, are generally deductible. See Note, 59 YALE L.J, 561
(1950) ; Helvering v. Hampton, 79 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1935) (payment of judgment for
fraud deductible). But cf. William F. Davis, Jr., 17 T.C. 549 (1951) (slim majority held
payments to corporation required of executive for violating the insider-profit provisions
of the Securities Exchange Act non-deductible because (1) considered "penalty," not
restitution, and (2) deductibility would frustrate statutory enforcement).
40. See 2 MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INc mE TAXATION § 12.103 n.74 (1942).
41. Where property is taken covertly or obtained by fraud, the statute of limitations
on the victim's right of recovery does not begin to run until the loss or fraud is dis-
covered or should have been discovered. To expect taxing authorities to determine when
the statutory period begins and ends in such situations is to demand the impossible, C1.
Walter J. Cutcliffe, 5 T.C.M. 673, 675 (1946).
42. See United States v. A. Augustine, 188 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1951) ; United States
v. Chapman, 168 F.2d 997 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 853 (1948); Currier v.
United States, 166 F.2d 346 (1st Cir. 1948) ; W. L. Kann, 18 T.C. No. 131 (1952); Louis
C. Buff Estate, 4 T.C.M. 1130 (1945).
Similarly, if the partners or officers are prosecuted for failure to include the "em-
bezzled" receipts in the company's income, they might defend by arguing either that the
company had never received the funds or that the omission was harmless because the
company was entitled to a theft deduction. See Currier v. United States, supra.
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funds.43 If the "embezzler" later "repays" the firm, he wlU have had the use
of the money without ever having incurred tax liability. If he decides to retain
the funds, he may keep alive his obligation to repay indefinitely by periodi-
cally renewing the note, or may have the company "forgive" the "debt" in a
year of low tax rates or when his income is small. In reported cases, such fatu-
ous arguments have failed because of the transparency of the pretended mis-
appropriations: claims of embezzlement have been rejected where the alleged
wrongdoers were the sole owners of a business ;-14 also where majority stock-
holders, after an audit disclosed a "misappropriation" by minority share-
holders active in a family corporation, made little or no effort to prosecute or
seek repayment.4a Nonetheless, the availability of the "embezzlement" argu-
ment provides a convenient straw for taxpayers to clutch in otherwise hope-
less litigation.
These defects seem to outweigh the policy arguments in favor of delayed
taxation. In Wilcox the Supreme Court apparently sought to protect the
rightful owner's ability to recover from the wrongdoer 40 by postponing the
latter's tax liability for the misappropriation until the rightful owner re-
nounced his rights or the statute of limitations barred his recovery. If taxes
accrue at the time of misappropriation and are paid promptly, the assets left
in the wrongdoer's hands may prove insufficient to satisfy the rightful owner's
claim. When the taxes are not paid and the wrongdoer's assets cannot satisfy
the claims of both the Government and the victim, a tax lien may accord the
Government rights to the assets superior to those of the rightful oIner.4 -
43. Cf. W. L. Kann, IS T.C. No. 131 (1952). The company's acceptance uf a note
from an "embezzling" partner or officer would prevent him from justifying, with the
arguments indicated in note 42 .supra, the failure to include the "embezzled" receipts in
the company's income.
44. Currier v. United States, 166 F2d 346 (1st Cir. 1948) (owner of one-man cor-
poration); Louis C. Buff Estate, 4 T.C.M. 1130 (1945) (same, pre-Wilcox); United
States v. A. Augustine, 188 F.2d 359 (3d Cir. 1951) (both partners in two-man partner-
ship). Cf. United States v. Chapman, 163 F.2d 997 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. S53
(1948) (defendant, who was president and principal shareholder, held liable for taxes on
over-ceiling price payments which he received personally and failed tQ transfer to the
corporation). For general discussion, see Rothwacks, Taxability of Corporate Receipts
Diverted by Officer-Stockholder, 7 N.Y.U. INsT. FED. TAx. 573 (1949).
45. W. L. Kann, 18 T.C. No. 131 (1952).
46. Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 410 (1946). See also MeKnight v. Com-
missioner, 127 F.2d 572, 574 (5th Cir. 1942).
47. As to property subject to tax liens, see I.N-r. Rnv. CoDE § 3670. Section 3671 pro-
vides that the lien shall arise upon receipt of the assessment list by the collector. Unless
a jeopardy assessment is made, there will be no assessment until the taxpayer has ben
notified of the deficiency and fails to pay, or, if he contests his liability, until a deision
against him by the Tax Court. Section 3672 provides that the tax lien shall nut be valid
as against mortgagees, pledgees, purchasers, or judgment creditors until recA:rded as
therein provided. See generally, 9 MmTr.Ns, THE LwV (IF FED ALL I:xoti T.Lwo!zo:;
§§ 54.38-54.51 (1943, Supp. 1952) ; Clark, Federal Tax Liens and Their Enforcemen , 33
VA. L. Rzv. 13 (1947).
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And if the wrongdoer enters either state insolvency or federal bankruptcy
proceedings, tax claims based on the misappropriation will receive priority
in the distribution of his assets.48 In each instance, the Government may frus-
trate, in whole or in part, the rightful owner's recovery. However, as a prac-
tical matter, it seems likely that in many cases the victim will locate the wrong-
doer and recover, or at least obtain a lien, before the Government asserts its
tax claim. And a victim who does recover or acquire a lien before dissipation
of the wrongdoer's assets or before the Government's lien arises will obviously
not be harmed by the fact that the wrongdoer incurs tax liability at the time
of misappropriation. Moreover, even where a tax lien has arisen or the wrong-
doer has entered insolvency or bankruptcy proceedings before the victim
asserts his rights, the victim can recover identifiable property or traceable
proceeds before payment of tax claims.40 In other cases, insurance may com-
pensate for, or a tax deduction may mitigate, the victim's loss.50 In any event,
48. The Government can obtain a tax lien under INT. REv. CoDE §§ 3670-2 or rely on
its statutory priority under REv. STAT. § 3466 (1875), 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1946), which
reads: "Whenever any person . . . is insolvent,... debts due to the United States shall
be first satisfied. . . ." Such debts include taxes owed the United States, Price v. United
States, 269 U.S. 492 (1926).
In state insolvency proceedings the Government, even without a lien, may use § 3466
in order to come before the rightful owner. In dicta, the Supreme Court has long indi-
cated that the Government's priority might be defeated by a "specific and perfected lien
upon the property at the time of insolvency." See United States v. Waddill, Holland &
Flinn, Inc., 323 U.S. 353, 355 (1945). But in no case has the Court held a non-consensual
lien sufficiently "specific and perfected" to defeat the Government's priority. Ibid.; Thelus-
son v. Smith, 2 Wheat. 396, 425 (U.S. 1817) (statute makes no exception in favor of
judgment creditors).
In federal bankruptcy proceedings, § 64a of the Bankruptcy Act of 1938, as amended,
11 U.S.C. § 104a (Supp. 1952), reduces unsecured tax claims to a fourth priority, while
§ 3466 claims receive a fifth priority. Hence, if the victim acquires a lien he will take
before the Government unless the Government has also obtained a lien which is prior in
time.
See generally 3 CoLLIm, BANKRUPTCY § 64.403 (14th ed., Moore, 1941, Supp. 1951);
4 id. §§67.20, 67.24 (1942, Supp. 1950); 9 MaRTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL IN coU
TAxATIoN §§ 54.10-54.37 (1943, Supp. 1952).
49. 3 CoLLIER, op. cit. supra note 48, §§ 60.18, 60.24; 4 id. §§ 70.25, 70.41. But where
the rightful owner must first void the insolvent's title in order to obtain such recovery,
failure to do so will reduce him to the status of a general creditor. 3 id. § 60.18.
50. INT. Ray. CODE §§23(e) and 23(f) permit deductions for losses from theft or
embezzlement in the "year in which sustained." U.S. Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.43-2 (1943).
But such losses can be deducted only to the extent not compensated by insurance. See
cases discussed in Geller & Rogers, Embezzlement Has Its Tax Problenms, Too, 26 TAxEs
1097, 1103-4 (1948). Courts disagreed, however, over the year in which such deductions
could be taken. Compare First Nat. Bank of Sharon v. Heiner, 66 F.2d 925 (3d Cir.
1933) (year misappropriation occurred), with Boston Consol. Gas Co. v. Commissioner,
128 F.2d 473, 476 (1st Cir. 1942) (year of discovery). Recently the Supreme Court
resolved this conflict by allowing deduction of embezzlement losses in the year of dis-
covery. Alison v. United States, 344 U.S. 167 (1952). To limit such deductions to
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the desire to prevent occasional losses to innocent victims falls short of justify-
ing postponement of taxation on all thefts and embezzlements.31
The four Rutkin dissenters opposed the inclusion of misappropriated funds
in taxable income on the policy ground that tax evasion prosecutions may be
used to punish the wrongdoer for the misappropriation itself, thereby permit-
ting the Federal Government to encroach upon the functions of local law enforce-
ment officers.52 If the minority intended to follow Wilcox and merely delay
taxation,53 the alleged evil would still be present in those cases where the
wrongdoer does not repay his victim and fails to include the misappropriated
property in his taxable income for the year in which h-is duty to repay is ex-
tinguished. Thus it seems more likely that the dissenters would permanently
exempt misappropriations from taxation. But the minority did not question
the taxability of profits of illegal businesses, such as gambling and bootlegging.
To justify the difference in treatment, they assumed that misappropriations
are "sporadic," in contrast to the "regular profits" of illegal enterprses.-
In view of recent revelations of organized extortion, thieving, and swindling,
this assumption seems erroneous.u Yet even if there is a factual distinction
the year of misappropriation would be unduly harsh on taxpayers since embezzlements
often remain undiscovered for many years. Id. at 192. For example, the average period
of concealment of bank embezzlements is ten to eleven years. N.Y. Times, Dec. 7, 1952,
§ 3, p. 6, col. 4.
Losses from swindling and extortion can be deducted as business ex-penses if "ordinary
and necessary." INT. Rzv. CODE § 23(a). To meet this test, expenses probably must be
both customary and not violative of express public policy. Reliable Mill: & Cream Co.,
Inc., 1938 P-H B.T.A. Mlemo. 38,290 (extortion payments by milk dealers not "ordinary
and necessary" because illegal). But cf. Marra Bros., Inc., 3 T.C.M. 1317 (1944) ("tips"
paid ship's officers by stevedoring firm to avoid noncooperation held deductible because
"ordinary and necessary"). In this context, public policy has been defined as "national or
state policies evidenced by some governmental declaration... ." Lilly v. Commissioner,
343 U.S. 90, 97 (1952) (opticians' kickbacks to prescribing oculists deductible although
violative of professional ethics). For the non-business taxpayer, swindling and extortion
losses might be deductible as theft losses. See Samuel M1. Felton, 5 T.C. 256 (1945)
(losses in Ponzi-type investment swindle deductible as "embezzlement" losses).
If an insurance company compensates the victim, it normally will be subrogated to his
rights against the wrongdoer. VANCE, LAW OF INSURANCE § 134 (3d ed. 1951).
51. Mr. Justice Burton has suggested a statutory amendment to deny the Govern-
ment a priority over a victim where the Government's tax claim arises out of the mis-
appropriation. See Commissioner v. Wilcox, 327 U.S. 404, 414 (1946) (dissenting opinion).
52. United States v. Rutldn, 343 U.S. 130, 141-7 (1952).
53. See notes 12 and 37 supra and accompanying text.
54. United States v. Rutkin, 343 U.S. 130, 141 (1952).
55. See, generally, the disclosures of the Kefauver Committee, SEN. REP. Nos. 141,
307, 725, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951), and the New York Crime Commission, N. Y. Times,
circa Dec. 1952-Jan. 1953; HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOCwrv 155-64, 250-6 (24 ed. 1952j.
Similarly, bootlegging and gambling may be conducted on a sporadic basis. In any event,
a tax on illegal income because of its regularity seems inconsistent with general tax pclic..
For example, gains of a single wager are taxed just as are regular profits of a profe-
sional gambler. A. L Voyer, 4 B.T.A. 1192 (1926) (lottery winnings).
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between the "regularity" of, for example, gambling as opposed to extortion,
the relevancy of "regularity" to taxability is questionable-particularly since
the dangers of federal punishment for local crimes would remain in tax evasion
prosecutions of gamblers." In any event, the encroachment argument misses
the essential point that the state and federal prosecutions are based on sepa-
rate acts. A prosecution for tax evasion is not a necessary consequence of a
profitable violation of local law; the criminal must also fail to report as income
the fruits of that crime. The dissenters were obviously aware of this. Their
real fear, therefore, seems to have been the possibility that evidence of the
illegal origins of a taxpayer's income will prejudice his case.5 7 Again, this
possibility also exists when the defendant is engaged in a "regular" illegal
business. The danger of prejudice should be met through extreme caution
by the trial judge in his conduct of the trial rather than by granting tax bene-
fits to one class of wrongdoers. To exempt misappropriators from taxation
because of the possible abuse in tax evasion prosecutions which might be
brought if they fail to report illegal income seems grossly unfair to honest
citizens, who must bear the usual burdens of taxation 8
56. For a list of prominent underworld entrepreneurs convicted of tax evasion, see
Baker, Taxation: Potential Destroyer of Crime, 29 Cm-KENT Rv. 197, 200 n.3 (1951).
The recent imposition of a wagering tax, INT. REv. CODE §§ 3285-98, reveals a congres-
sional intent to use the taxing power as a positive weapon against criminals. The dis-
senters did not discuss this index of congressional intent.
57. Rutkin v. United States, 343 U.S. 130, 145-7 (1952). See United States v.
Caserta, 199 F.2d 905 (3d Cir. 1952) (in tax evasion prosecution based on net worth
theory, Government permitted to show certain payments by taxpayer were fines imposed
for violations of local law).
58. See United States v. Sullivan, 274 U.S. 259, 263 (1927). The Rutkin dissenters
sought to avoid the "unfairness" objection by arguing that the cost of collecting taxes
on misappropriations would be greater than the revenue obtained. Rutkin v. United
States, 343 U.S. 130, 141 (1952). There is substantial evidence to the contrary. Mis-
appropriations mount up to sizable sums annually. For example, the annual total of em-
bezzlements has been estimated at $400,000,000. Peterson, Why Honest People Steal, 38
J. CRim. LAW & CwmRiNoIouy 94 (1947). Moreover, misappropriations are not limited to
isolated acts of small-time amateurs but also form a lucrative source of income for or-
ganized crime syndicates. See sources cited in note 55 supra. Furthermore, collection of
revenue on illegal income generally has thus far more than paid its way, Following the
recommendations of the Kefauver Committee, SEN. REP. No. 141, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 34
(1951), the Treasury Department assigned a special "racket squad" to examine the in-
come tax returns of criminals. Despite the difficulties inherent in building a successful
case where it is hard to obtain witnesses to specific receipts and where the taxpayer
usually keeps few records, the "racket squad," operating on a $15,000,000 budget, col-
lected $95,000,000 in additional taxes and penalties in its first year of operation. Lader,
A New Way to Wipe Out Rackets, N.Y. Herald Tribune, Dec. 7, 1952, § 7, p. 7. These
statistics do not show the amount of taxes paid on illegal income without resort to en-
forcement. The fear of a tax evasion conviction has apparently led many criminals to
report such gains. Baker, Taxation: Potential Destroyer of Crime, 29 Cili-KENT RLv.
197, 216 (1951).
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